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Determinative

Constitutional

Provisions, Statutesf

Ordinances,

and Rules
The following rules are determinative in this appeal:
U.R.C.P. Rule 56(c):
. . . The judgment sought should be rendered
forthwith if the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on
file together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact and that the moving parties are
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. .
Utah Rule of Evidence 105 titled "Limited Admissibility:"
When evidence which is admissible as to one
party or for one purpose but not admissible
as to another party or for another purpose is
admitted, the court, upon request, shall
restrict the evidence to the proper scope and
instruct the jury accordingly.
Utah Rule of Evidence 402 titled "Relevant Evidence Generally
Admissible; Irrelevant Evidence Inadmissible:"
All relevent evidence is admissible, except
as otherwise provided by the Constitution of
the United States or the Constitution of the
State of Utah, statute, or by these rules, or
by other rules applicable in courts of this
state. Evidence which is not relevant is not
admissible.
Utah Rule of Evidence 407 titled "Subsequent Remedial Measures:"
When, after an event, measures are taken
which, if taken previously, would have made
the event less likely to occur, evidence of
the subsequent measures is not admissible to
prove negligence or culpable conduct in
connection with the event.
This rule does
not require the exclusion of evidence of
subsequent measures when offered for another
purpose, show as proving ownership, control,
or feasibility of precautionary measures, if
controverted, or impeachment.
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

DORA SCHREITER,
Plaintiff/Appellant,
Argument Priority
Classification: 15

vs.
WASATCH MANOR, INC.,

Case No. 920573-CA
Defendant/Appellee.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF/APPELLANT
DORA SCHREITER
APPEAL FROM DISTRICT COURT ORDER
GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO DEFENDANT
ON APRIL 22, 1992
ARGUMENT
I.

THE COST ESTIMATE DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A SUBSEQUENT REMEDIAL
MEASURE UNDER RULE 407 AND IS THEREFORE ADMISSIBLE.
The authorities that have considered the scope of Rule

407 indicate it is quite narrow.

Only when the policy on which

the rule is founded is furthered should relevant evidence be

excluded.
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contained in Rule 407 is illustrative, not exhaustive.
page 130.

Id. at

If a subsequent remedial measure is relevant to show

anything other than negligence it comes in under the doctrine of
multiple admissibility contained in Utah Rule of Evidence 105.
At common law, the exclusion of subsequent remedial measures in a
negligence action was required only when the evidence was offered
to show a breach of an existing duty by a defendant.

On the

other hand, if the subsequent remedial measure was offered to
show only

the existence of a duty, it was admissible.

As stated

by Wright and Graham:
Given the intent to preserve the common law,
Rule 407 should also be read as not applying
to proof of remedial measures where relevant
to other elements of the negligence cause of
action.
Id. at pg. 122.

Interestingly, the footnote included by Wright

and Graham after this statement refers to the advisory committee
note to the predecessor to Utah Rule of Evidence 407, Utah Rule
of Evidence 51, which stated that:

"This rule relates only to

negligence and not to causation.11.
The

manner

in

which

plaintiff

sought

to

use

the

evidence of the cost estimate obtained by Wasatch Manor for
installing a sprinkler system was not to show a breach of any
duty

by

Wasatch

Manor

but

was

rather

to

demonstrate

that

installing such a sprinkler system in Wasatch Manor was feasible.
The evidence related directly to demonstrating to a jury that a
duty existed on the part of Wasatch Manor to install such a

3

sprinkler system given all the circumstances of the case.

Under

the authority cited above, use of that information to show that a
duty existed on the part of Wasatch Manor does not violate the
principles that underline Rule 407.

As noted in the original

brief, admission of this crucial bit of evidence is the best
possible information available about whether installation of such
a precautionary measure was feasible and should have been carried
out by Wasatch Manor before the fire broke out at the high rise
retirement home.
III. THE COST ESTIMATE IS ADMISSIBLE TO PROVE THE FEASIBILITY OF
PRECAUTIONARY MEASURES BECAUSE FEASIBILITY HAS BEEN
CONTROVERTED BY WASATCH MANOR.
Wasatch Manor argues in its brief that on the one hand,
feasibility has not been controverted and therefore under the
language of Rule 407, the information on the cost estimate may
not be admitted.

However, it is clear from the stance it has

taken in the case that Wasatch. Manor does contest feasibility.
Wasatch Manor
Judgment

argues vigorously

was properly

granted

that the Motion

for

because the appellant

Summary
had not

carried her burden to show "the cost of designing, constructing,
and

installing

the

sprinkler

Defendant/Appellee, pp. 8.

system."

Brief

of

Either Wasatch Manor must concede

that feasibility is not an issue and that the appellant has no
responsibility as part of a prima facie case to establish the
cost

of

designing,

constructing,

and

installing

a

sprinkler

system, in which case the issue concerning the cost estimate is

4

moot, or the appellee must dispute this, put the appellant to her
proof, and controvert the issue of feasibility.
has chosen to do the latter•

Wasatch Manor

It cannot now be heard to say that

feasibility is uncontroverted.
The reason
allowing

for requiring

introduction

feasibility

is that:

of

that dispute exist before

subsequent

remedial

measures

on

". . . feasibility, unlike many other

permissible uses, is an issue that exists in almost every case."
Wright and Graham, supra, §5286, p. 133.

As stated in footnote

29 on pg. 133, "If this 'exception1 is permitted to be used when
there is no real issue of feasibility, it would soon devour the
rule."
Wasatch Manor cites in support of its proposition that
evidence of subsequent precautionary measures may be introduced
only if feasibility is controverted the case of Werner v. Upjohn
Co.. Inc.. 628 F.2d 848 (1980), cert.den., 449 U.S. 1080 (1981).
Werner does

in fact stand

for the proposition cited by the

defendant that unless feasibility is controverted by the nonoffering party, evidence of the subsequent remedial measure will
not come in unless offered for some other acceptable purpose.
However, the appellee in this case does not have any basis to
claim that feasibility is uncontroverted.

Werner is helpful to

the appellant because it verifies that under F.R.E. 105 evidence
that

is

inadmissible

for one purpose may be admissible

for

another and that the usual solution for such a problem is to
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IV.

APPELLANT H A S NO BURDEN TO SHOW WASATCH MANOR'S ABILITY TO
PAY FOR THF -r^T OF INSTALLING T H E SPRINKLER SYSTEM.
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by the plaintiff, but that it is in the nature of the defense,
rather than a part of the plaintiff's prima facie case.

Wasatch

Manor may very well be correct when as it argues in its brief
that this is a classic example of a risk/benefit analysis.

But

it is also clear under the case law cited by the appellant in her
primary brief that the question of whether a legal duty exists
under all the facts is left in the hands of the jury.

Sufficient

evidence has been presented to show Wasatch Manor breached its
duty

by

not

installing

a sprinkler

system

in the building.

Whether such a breach occurred is something that must be decided
by the ultimate fact finder in the case, the jury.
CONCLUSION
The cost estimate of putting a sprinkler system into
Wasatch Manor is admissible evidence under the Rules of Evidence
and specifically under Rule 407.

In addition, the appellant has

no burden to show that Wasatch Manor was able to pay for the cost
of installing a sprinkler system.

The order of the trial court

granting Summary Judgment to the defendant should be reversed and
the case remanded for trial before a jury.
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